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Abstract
We dene generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unaware-
ness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated)
rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence.
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In real-life dynamic interactions, unawareness of players regarding the relevant actions
available to them is at least as prevalent as uncertainty regarding other players' strategies,
payos or moves of nature. Players frequently become aware of actions they (or other
players) could have taken in retrospect, when they can only re-evaluate the past actions
chosen by partners or rivals who were aware of those actions from the start, and hence
re-assess their likely future behavior. Yet, while uncertainty can be captured within the
standard framework of extensive-form games with imperfect information, unawareness
and mutual uncertainty regarding awareness require an extension of this framework.
Such an extension is the rst task of the current paper.
At rst, one may wonder why the standard framework would not suce. After all, if
a player is unaware of an action which is actually available to her, then for all practical
purposes she cannot choose it. Why wouldn't it be enough simply to truncate from the
tree all the paths starting with such an action?
The reason is that the strategic implications of unawareness of an action are distinct
from the unavailability of the same action. To see this, consider the following standard
\battle-of-the-sexes"game (where Bach and Stravinsky concerts are the two available
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augmented by a dominant Mozart concert for player II:
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The new game is dominance solvable, and (M,M) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that the Mozart concert is in a distant town, and II can go there only if player
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player II may conclude by forward induction that player I would go to the Bach concert
with the hope of getting the payo 3 (because by giving the car to II, player I could have
achieved the payo 2). The best reply of player II is to follow suit and attend the Bach
concert as well. Hence, in the unique rationalizable outcome, player I is not to give the
car to player II and to go to the Bach concert.1
But what if, instead, the Mozart concert is in town but player II is initially unaware
of the Mozart concert, while player I can enable player II to go to the concert simply by
telling him about it? If player II remains unaware of the Mozart concert, then neither
does he conceive that player I could have told him about the Mozart concert, and in
particular he cannot carry out any forward-induction calculation. For him, the game is
a standard battle-of-the-sexes game, where both actions of player I are rationalizable.
This strategic situation is depicted in Figure 2.
The strategic situation is not a standard extensive-form game (more on this in Section
2.6 below). If player I chooses not to tell player II about the Mozart concert, then player
II's information set (depicted in blue) consists of a node in a simpler game {namely the
one-shot battle-of-the-sexes with no preceding move by player I.
This is a simple example of the general novel framework that we dene in Section 2 for
dynamic interaction with possibly mutual unawareness of actions, generalizing standard
extensive-form games. The framework will not only allow modeling of situations in which
one player is certain that another player is unaware of portions of the game tree, as in the
above example, but also of situations in which a player is uncertain regarding the way
another player views the game tree, as well as situations in which the player is uncertain
regarding the uncertainties of the other player about yet other players' views of the game
tree, and so forth.
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In fact, this framework allows not just for unawareness but also for other forms of
misconception about the structure of the game. Section 6 species further properties
obtaining in generalized extensive-form games where the only source of players `miscon-
ception' is unawareness and mutual unawareness of available actions and paths in the
game. Since we focus on this type of unawareness, most of the examples in the paper
satisfy the further properties specied in Section 6. Nevertheless, modeling awareness of
unawareness does require the general framework in Section 2, as explained at its end.
In this new framework, for each information set of a player her strategy species {
from the point of view of the modeler { what the player would do if and when that
information set of hers is ever reached. In this sense, a player does not necessarily `own'
her full strategy at the beginning of the game, because she might not be initially aware
of all of her information sets. That's why a sensible generalization of Pearce's (1984)
notion of extensive-form rationalizability is non-trivial.
In Section 3 we put forward a modied denition, prove existence, and show the
sense in which it coincides with extensive-form rationalizability in standard extensive-
form games.
We focus here on a rationalizability solution concept rather than on some notion of
equilibrium. While an equilibrium is ideally interpreted as a rest-point of some dynamic
learning or adaptation process, or alternatively as a pre-meditated agreement or expec-
tation, we nd it dicult to carry over such interpretations to a setting in which every
increase of awareness is by denition a shock or a surprise. Once a player's view of
4the game itself is challenged in the course of play, it is hard to justify the idea that a
convention or an agreement for the continuation of the game are readily available.
We chose to focus on extensive-form rationalizability because it embodies forward
induction reasoning. If an opponent makes a player aware of some relevant aspect of
reality, it is implausible to dismiss the increased level of awareness as an unintended
consequence of the opponent's behavior. Rather, the player should try to rationalize
the opponent's choice, re-interpret the opponent's past behavior, and try to infer from
it the opponent's future moves. Extensive-form rationalizability indeed captures a `best
rationalization principle' (Battigalli, 1997).
With rationalizability, generalized games are necessary for properly modeling un-
awareness; trying to model unawareness by having the unaware player assigning prob-
ability zero to the contingency of which she is unaware might give rise to a completely
dierent rationalizable behavior, which does not square with unawareness in the proper
sense of the word. To see this consider the following example.
A Decision Maker (DM) has to choose between two policies, a0 and a1. Before choos-
ing she gets a recommendation from an expert via a narrow communication channel,
through which the expert can recommend either \0" or \1". The expert makes the rec-
ommendation after observing the state of nature, which may be either 0 or 1, and which
the DM does not see. The interests of the expert and the DM are completely aligned:
They each bear a cost of 1 if a1 is implemented when the state of nature is 0 or vice
versa. The expert furthermore bears a cost of 10 from \lying", i.e. from recommending
\0" when the state of nature is 1 or recommending \1" when the state of nature is 0.
Assume the DM is aware only of the state 0 and unaware of 1. The dynamic
interaction is hence modeled by the generalized game in Figure 3.
In this generalized game the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the DM is
to always implement the policy a0: she does not conceive of a contingency that would
make the policy a1 superior to a0 even if she hears from the expert the recommendation
\1"; in such a case she regrettably concludes that the expert behaved in an irrational
way and bore the cost of \lying".
However, if we were to model the DM alternatively as being aware of 1 but assigning
probability zero to it, the strategic interaction would be modeled by the standard game
in Figure 4.
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a0 upon hearing \0" from the expert, but to implement a1 upon hearing the recommen-
dation \1". Indeed, extensive-form rationalizability requires the DM to base her choice
on a system of beliefs about the expert's strategies with which at every information set
of hers she maintains a belief that best rationalizes the choices of the expert which could
have led to that information set. In particular, upon hearing the recommendation \1"
from the expert, the only way for the DM to rationalize it is to assume that the state of
nature is nevertheless 1, where recommending \1" is strictly dominant for the expert;
and in 1 the optimal choice for the DM is a1.
Conceptually, upon hearing the surprising recommendation \1" both choices of the
DM have their internal logic. The former gives priority to \only 0 is conceivable",
the latter to the rationality of the expert. But in the latter case, if initially the DM is
genuinely unaware of 1, there is no reason why the DM would conceive precisely of 1 and
not of some alternative description 0
1 of nature that would also rationalize the expert's
6recommendation \1"; some such conceptualizations 0
1 need not necessarily induce the
DM to adopt the expert's recommendation. Generalized games lend themselves also
to modeling such misconceptions that may arise upon a surprise, as demonstrated in
Figure 5. Here, the DM's rationalizable strategy is to choose a0 also upon hearing the
Figure 5:
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(surprising) recommendation \1" , because the DM believes this recommendation was
strictly dominant for the expert but that her interest and those of the expert are now
opposed.
Our framework for dynamic interaction under unawareness seems to be simpler than
the one proposed by Halpern and R^ ego (2006) and R^ ego and Halpern (2007), in which
they investigated the notions of Nash and sequential equilibrium, respectively.2
2The simplication obtained in our framework is due to the fact that our initial building block is
a tree representing physical moves, with information sets dened only in the sub-trees which represent
subjective views of the game (and subjective views thereof, etc.); in contrast, Halpern and R^ ego (2006)
had information sets dened already in their basic tree. As a result, not all sub-trees could be consid-
ered, and Halpern and R^ ego (2006) had to postulate additional conditions relating the information sets
in sub-trees to those of the basic tree.
Our framework is also more parsimonious than the one proposed by Feinberg (2009). Feinberg (2009)
denes unawareness with analogous properties both for static and dynamic games, by explicit unbounded
sequences of mutual \views" of the game. In his dynamic setting, a view is identied with a decision
node. This means that even a standard extensive-form game has to be described in Feinberg (2009) by
innitely many copies of the the same game tree, specifying explicitly how each player views the game
in each of her decision nodes; how each player views, in each of her decision node, the way in which each
other player views the game in each of their decision nodes; etc. In our setting such an innite replication
71.1 Related Literature
Our framework for dynamic interaction under unawareness seems to be signicantly sim-
pler than the one proposed by Halpern and R^ ego (2006) and R^ ego and Halpern (2007),
in which they investigated the notions of Nash and sequential equilibrium, respectively.
The simplication obtained in our framework is due to the fact that our initial building
block is a tree representing physical moves, with information sets dened only in the
sub-trees which represent subjective views of the game (and subjective views thereof,
etc.); in contrast, Halpern and R^ ego (2006) had information sets dened already in their
basic tree. As a result, not all sub-trees could be considered, and Halpern and R^ ego
(2006) had to postulate additional conditions relating the information sets in sub-trees
to those of the basic tree.
Our framework is also more parsimonious than the one proposed by Feinberg (2009).
Feinberg (2009) dened unawareness with analogous properties both for static and dy-
namic games, by explicit unbounded sequences of mutual \views" of the game. In his
dynamic setting, a view is identied with a decision node. This means that even a
standard extensive-form game has to be described in Feinberg (2009) by innitely many
copies of the the same game tree, specifying explicitly how each player views the game
in each of her decision nodes; how each player views, in each of her decision node, the
way in which each other player views the game in each of their decision nodes; etc. In
our setting such an innite replication is avoided, since our denition of information sets
encapsulates, by its design, all these mutual points of view.3
Li (2006) considered a model for dynamic unawareness with perfect information, in
which at each decision node a player may have a subjective view of the game tree. Her
model is more restricted than ours, since it requires there to be one particular default
is avoided, since our denition of information sets encapsulates, by its design, all these mutual points of
view.
Another important dierence is that Feinberg (2009) does not dene perfect recall, and this might
hamper the extension of known solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or extensive-form ra-
tionalizability that rely on perfect recall. Extensive-form rationalizability is the focal solution concept
that we extend, dene, and analyze in our paper, and to this eect we extend the denition of perfect
recall to our setting.
3Another important dierence is that Feinberg (2009) does not dene perfect recall, and this might
hamper the extension of known solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or extensive-form ra-
tionalizability that rely on perfect recall. Extensive-form rationalizability is the focal solution concept
that we extend, dene, and analyze in our paper, and to this eect we extend the denition of perfect
recall to our setting.
8path of which all players are commonly aware, and since it does not allow for imperfect
information.
Ozbay (2007) studied sender-receiver games, in which an `announcer' can make an
unaware decision maker aware of more states of nature before the decision maker takes
an action. Such games can also be naturally formulated as a particular instance of
our framework. For these games Ozbay studied an equilibrium notion incorporating
forward-induction reasoning. Filiz-Ozbay (2007) studied a related setting in which the
aware announcer is a risk neutral insurer, while the decision maker is a risk averse or
ambiguity averse insuree. At equilibrium, the insurer does not always reveal all relevant
contingencies to the insuree.
In a companion paper, Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2011a) we introduce a rene-
ment of extensive-form rationalizability, called prudent rationalizability, and show that
it rules out less plausible outcomes in examples due to Pearce (1984) and Ozbay (2007).
We apply to a model of veriable communication of Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and
show that prudent rationalizability implies full unraveling of information in their model.
Yet, if the receiver is unaware of a dimension, then full unraveling does not need to oc-
cur. Thus, this is yet another example in which unawareness has strategic implications
which are genuinely dierent than those implied by asymmetric information. In another
companion paper, Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2011b), we characterize extensive-form
rationalizability (resp. prudent rationalizability) in generalized extensive-form games by
iterated elimination of conditional strictly (resp. weakly) dominated strategies in the
associated generalized normal-form game.4
Our aim is to provide a general framework for modeling misperceptions about the
availability of actions in dynamic strategic situations. Dierent kinds of perception biases
among players in games have been a popular topic in the recent literature on behavioral
game theory. For instance, in static games Eyster and Rabin (2005) analyze players
with correct conjectures about opponents' actions but misperceptions about how those
opponents' actions are correlated with the opponents' information. In multi-stage games
with moves of nature, Jehiel (2005) studies players that bundle nodes at which other
players choose into \analogy classes", correctly anticipate the average behavior for each
analogy class, and thus may have misperceptions about how others' behavior is related
others' information. Recently there has been a renaissance of non-equilibrium iterative
4Currently we are unaware of further papers focusing directly and explicitly on dynamic
games with unawareness. The literature on unawareness in general is growing fast { see e.g.
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm
9solution concepts in behavioral game theory like level-k thinking and related models (e.g.
Stahl and Wilson, 1995, Camerer, Hu and Chong, 2004, Crawford and Iriberri, 2007).
Note that our iterative solution concept, extensive-form rationalizability, does not only
provide behavioral predictions in the limit but also at every nite level of rationalization.
2 Generalized extensive-form games
To dene a generalized extensive-form game  , consider rst, as a building block, a nite
game with perfect information and simultaneous moves 5 with a set of players I, a set of
decision nodes N0, active players In at node n with nite action sets Ai
n of player i 2 In
(for n 2 N0), chance nodes C0, and terminal nodes Z0 with a payo vector (pz
i)i2I 2 RI
for the players for every z 2 Z0. The nodes  N0 = N0 [ C0 [ Z0 constitute a tree,




arborescence (that is, the predecessors of each node in  N0 are totally ordered by l), for




n and n's immediate successors, and there is a unique node in  N0 with no predecessors
{ the root of the tree.
2.1 Partially ordered set of trees
Consider now a family T of subtrees of  N0. A subtree is dened by a subset of nodes
 N0
0   N0 for which
   N0;l

is also a tree (i.e. an arborescence in which a unique node




to signify that the nodes of T 0 constitute a subset of the nodes of T 00.
One of the trees T1 2 T is meant to represent the modeler's view of the paths of
play that are objectively feasible.6 Each other tree T 2 T represents the feasible paths
of play as subjectively viewed by some player at some node in T1; or as the frame of
mind attributed to the player at some node of T1 by another player (or even by the same
5We follow here the terminology of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) and Dubey and Kaneko (1984).
6In generalized extensive-form games modeling unawareness (see Section 2.5 below), T1 will coincide
with  N0. In more general applications including delusion (like in the game of Figure 5 above) or awareness
of unawareness (see Section 2.6 below)  N0 may include additional nodes not in T1. In such a case  N0
need be one of the trees in T.
10player at a later stage of the game, after her awareness regarding the feasible paths has
evolved), whose own frame of mind regarding the feasible paths is represented by yet
another T 0 2 T; and so forth.
Denote by NT





We require three properties:
1. All the terminal nodes in each tree T 2 T are copies of nodes in Z0.
2. For every tree T 2 T, every node n 2 T and every active player i 2 In there exists a
subset of actions Ai;T
n  Ai





onto n's successors in T.
3. If for two decision nodes n, n0 2 NT






Property 1 is needed to ensure that each terminal node of each tree T 2 T is associated
with well dened payos to the players. Property 2 means that at every node n 2 T the
actions available to each active player i 2 In are independent of the actions the other




n is a product set). Property 3
means that i's active nodes NT
i are partitioned into equivalence classes, such that the
actions available to player i are identical within each equivalence class and disjoint in
distinct equivalence classes. It will be needed for the denition of information sets which
follows shortly.8
In each tree T 2 T denote by nT the copy in T of the node n 2  N0 whenever the copy
of n is part of the tree T; with the caveat that if the move ai
n leads from n to n0, then
ai
n leads also from the copy nT to the copy n0
T. Denote by N the union of all decision
nodes in all trees T 2 T, by C the union of all chance nodes, by Z the union of terminal
nodes, and by  N = N [ C [ Z (copies nT of a given node n in dierent subtrees T are
distinct from one another, so that  N is a disjoint union of sets of nodes).
7Sometimes the modeler may want to impose an additional property: If in a subtree T00 2 T the
probabilities of reaching  n1;:::  nk 2  N from the chance node c 2 C are p n1
c > 0;:::;p nk
c > 0 but some of
these nodes do not appear in a subtree T0  T00, then the probabilities of reaching the remaining nodes
emanating from c are renormalized in so as to sum to 1 in T0. We do not impose this property here
since it may be natural in some contexts but unnatural in others.
8The idea will be that in a given tree T, each action will correspond only to one view the player can
have regarding the way the dynamic interaction has evolved that far, and will hence be available at (all
the nodes of) a unique information set.
11In what follows, when refering to a node in  N we will typically avoid the subscript T
when no confusion may arise. For a node n 2  N we denote by Tn the tree containing n.
2.2 Information sets
In standard extensive-form game, an information set i (n) of a player i is both (1) the
set of nodes that the player considers as possible at n, and (2) the set of nodes in which
the player has the same state of mind as in the nodes which she considers as possible at
n.
In generalized games the two notions need not coincide: at a node n of the tree
Tn 2 T, the player may conceive the feasible paths to be described by a dierernt tree
T 0 2 T, and in particular to conceive the possible nodes i (n) she may currently be in
to be a subset of T 0 rather than of Tn; and in such case n will not be contained in i (n).
The information set i (n) thus generalizes (1) above; the set of nodes (2) at which the
player conceives i (n) to be possible may include additional nodes which belong to trees
outside the tree T 0 containing i (n).
Formally, for each decision node n 2 N, dene for each active player i 2 In an
information set i (n) with the following properties:
I0 Connement: i (n)  T for some tree T.
I1 No-delusion given the awareness level: If i(n)  Tn then n 2 i(n).
I2 Introspection: If n0 2 i (n) then i (n0) = i (n).
I3 No divining of currently unimaginable paths, no expectation to forget currently
conceivable paths: If n0 2 i (n)  T 0 (where T 0 2 T is a tree) and there is a path
n0;:::;n00 2 T 0 such that i 2 In0 \ In00 then i (n00)  T 0.
I4 No imaginary actions: If n0 2 i (n) then Ai
n0  Ai
n.
I5 Distinct action names in disjoint information sets: For a subtree T, if n;n0 2 T and
Ai
n = Ai
n0 then i (n0) = i (n).
I6 Perfect recall: Suppose that player i is active in two distinct nodes n1 and nk,
and there is a path n1;n2;:::;nk such that at n1 player i takes the action ai. If
n0 2 i (nk), then there exists a node n0
1 6= n0 and a path n0
1;n0
2;:::;n0
` = n0 such
that i (n0
1) = i (n1) and at n0
1 player i takes the action ai.
12The following gures (Figure 6) illustrate properties I0 to I6.
Properties (I1), (I2), (I4), and (I5) are standard for extensive-form games, and prop-
erties (I0) and (I6) generalize other standard properties of extensive-form games to our
generalized setting. The essentially new property is (I3). At each information set of a
player, property (I3) connes the player's anticipation of her future view of the game to
the view she currently holds (even if, as a matter of fact, this anticipation is about to be
shuttered as the game evolves).
We denote by Hi the set of i's information sets in all trees. For an information set
hi 2 Hi; we denote by Thi the tree containing hi: For two information sets hi;h0
i in a
given tree T; we say that hi precedes h0
i (or that h0
i succeeds hi) if for every n0 2 h0
i there
is a path n;:::;n0 in T such that n 2 hi. We denote hi   h0
i.
Remark 1 The following property is implied by I2 and I4: If n0;n00 2 hi where hi = i (n)
is an information set, then Ai
n0 = Ai
n00.
Proof. If n0;n00 2 hi where hi = i(n) is some information set, then by introspection





If n 2 hi we write also Ahi for Ai
n.
Remark 2 Properties I0, I1, I2 and I6 imply no absent-mindedness: No information
set hi contains two distinct nodes n;n0 on some path in some tree.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists an information set hi with a
node n 2 hi such that some other node in hi precedes n in the tree Tn. Denote by
n0 the rst node on the path from the root to n that is also in hi: By I1 we have
n0 2 i (n0) = hi = i (n), and by perfect recall I6 there exists a path n00 = n0
1;:::;n0
` = n0,
such that at n00 player i had the same state of mind as in n0, i.e. i(n00) = i(n0). By I1,
we have n00 2 i(n00) = i(n0) = hi and n00 is a predecessor of n0, a contradiction. 
The perfect recall property I6 and Remark 2 guarantee that with the precedence
relation   player i's information sets Hi form an arborescence: For every information
set h0
i 2 Hi, the information sets preceding it fhi 2 Hi : hi   h0
ig are totally ordered by
 .
13Figure 6: Properties I0 to I6
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14For trees T;T 0 2 T we denote T  T 0 whenever for some node n 2 T and some
player i 2 In it is the case that i (n)  T 0: Denote by ,! the transitive closure of .
That is, T ,! T 00 if and only if there is a sequence of trees T;T 0;:::;T 00 2 T satisfying
T  T 0    T 00.
2.3 Generalized games
A generalized extensive-form game   consists of a partially ordered set T of subtrees of
a tree  N0 satisfying properties 1-2 above, along with information sets i (n) for every
n 2 T; T 2 T and i 2 In, satisfying properties I0-I6 above.
For every tree T 2 T, the T-partial game is the partially ordered set of trees including
T and all trees T 0 in   satisfying T ,! T 0, with information sets as dened in  . A T-
partial game is a generalized game, i.e. it satises all properties 1-2 and I0-I6.
We denote by HT
i the set of i's information sets in the T-partial game.
For example, for the generalized game   in Figure 5, the tree  N0 appears below in
Figure 7.  N0 starts by nature choosing between 0 (following which a0 is the optimal
action for both players), 1 (following which a1 is optimal for both) or 0
1 (following which
a0 is optimal for the Decision Maker (DM) but suboptimal for the Expert (E)).
Figure 7:
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However, in the generalized game   of Figure 5 the tree which represents the physical
paths of the game is not  N0 but rather T1; which appears in the upper left part of Figure 5.
Moreover,  N0 is none of the trees in T = fT1;T2;T3g of  , and hence  N0 does not appear
in Figure 5.
In T1 if the Expert, after learning nature's move, announces `0', the DM is unaware of
the fact that nature could have chosen 1. The DM's frame of mind is hence represented
by the tree T3 at the bottom of gure 5. According to the DM's conception there she
15does not miss any information, and her information set is a singleton. This single node is
also the unique node considered as possible by the DM at T1 after hearing the message `0'
(and hence the two arrows going from T1 downwards to that singleton in T3). Moreover,
under this frame of mind T3, by which only 0 is feasible, the DM conceives that she
would have a singleton information set in T3 even if E were to announce `1'.
The truth of the matter, as portrayed in the tree of physical paths T1, is dierent.
If E announces `1', the DM gets to believe that nature could have chosen not between
0 and 1 (as was actually the case) but rather between 0 and 0
1: This is portrayed by
the fact that after hearing `1' in T1; the nodes that the DM considers as possible are in
T2; the tree in the upper left part of gure 5. The information set of the DM in T2 after
hearing `1' contains two nodes, corresponding to the two possible choices of nature that
the DM considers as possible there { 0 and 0
1.
Moreover, in this state of mind the DM is surprised, in the sense that she realizes
that had she heard `0' from the Expert, she would not suspect that nature could choose
anything beyond 0: This is reected by the fact that in T2, the information set of the
DM had she heard `0' is contained in T3.
The T1-partial game is the entire game   with the set of trees fT1;T2;T3g. The
T2-partial game consists only of the trees fT2;T3g. The T1-partial game is a standard
extensive-form game with the unique tree T:
2.4 Strategies
A (pure) strategy










the set of strategy proles in the generalized extensive-form game.
If si = (ahi)hi2Hi 2 Si; we denote by
si (hi) = ahi
the player's action at the information set hi.
16With the strategy si; at node n 2 Ni dene the player's action at n to be si (i (n)).
Thus, the strategy si species what player i does at each of her active nodes n 2 Ni;
both in case n 2 i (n) and in case i (n) is a subset of nodes of a tree which is distinct
than the tree Tn to which n belongs.
As Rubinstein (1991) pointed out, even in standard extensive-form games the inter-
pretation of the notion of a strategy is involved: an action prescribed by a strategy at an
information set which is excluded by an earlier move of that very strategy is implicitly
interpreted in game theory as the beliefs the other players entertain regarding the player's
move if that information set were reached.
A similar interpretation pertains even more forcefully in generalized games. In a
generalized game   only the tree T1 2 T represents the physical paths in the game; every
other tree in T represents the subjective view of the feasible paths in the mind of a player,
or the view of the feasible paths that a player believes that another player may have in
mind, etc. Moreover, as the actual game in T1 evolves, a player may become aware of
paths of which she was unaware earlier, and the way she views the game may alter as
well.
Thus, in generalized extensive-form games, a strategy cannot be conceived as an
ex ante plan of action, both for the reason elaborated by Rubinstein (1991) and the
additional reasons above. Formally, a strategy si of player i is a list of answers to
the questions \what would the player do if hi were the set of nodes she considered as
possible?", for hi 2 Hi. This list of answers should be interpreted as follows. For every
given frame of mind T 2 T that player i may entertain about the feasible paths (a frame
of mind which i actually has at some node in the actual game tree T1, or attributed to i
by player j at some node of T1 [at which j's frame of mind may be yet another T 0 2 T],
etc.),
1. for every information set i (n)  T the action si (i (n)) should be interpreted as
the action that player i actually takes at n under the strategy si; if and when n is
reached; and
2. for every information set i (n00)  T 00 6= T the action si (i (n00)) should be inter-
preted as the action that player i would have taken at n00 if her frame of mind were
T 00 rather than T. This means that when player j considers as possible that the
node n00 can be reached, j believes that under the strategy si player i would take
the action si (i (n00)) at n00; if and when n00 were reached.
17For a strategy si 2 Si and a tree T 2 T, we denote by sT
i the strategy in the T-partial
game induced by si (i.e., sT
i (hi) = si (hi) for every information set hi of player i in the
T-partial game). If Ri  Si is some set of strategies of player i, denote by RT
i the set of
strategies induced by Ri in the T-partial game. The set of i's strategies in the T-partial
game is thus denoted by ST
i . Denote by ST =
Q
j2I ST
j the set of strategy proles in the
T -partial game.
We say that a strategy prole s = (sj)j2I 2 S reaches a node n 2 T if the players'
actions sj (j (n0))j2In0 and nature's moves in the nodes n0 2 T lead to n with a positive
probability. Notice that by property (I4) (\no imaginary actions"), sj (j (n0))j2I is
indeed well dened: even if j (n0) = 2 T for some n0 2 T, the action prole sj (j (n0))j2In0
is an action prole which is actually available in T to the active players j 2 In0 at n0.
We say that a strategy prole s 2 S reaches the information set hi 2 Hi if s reaches
some node n 2 hi.
We say that the strategy si 2 Si reaches the information set hi if there is a strategy
prole s i 2 S i of the other players such that the strategy prole (si;s i) reaches hi.
Otherwise, we say that the information set hi is excluded by the strategy si.
Similarly, we say that the strategy prole s i 2 S i reaches the information set hi if
there exists a strategy si 2 Si such that the strategy prole (si;s i) reaches hi.
As is the case also in standard games, for every given node, a given strategy prole of
the players induces a distribution over terminal nodes in each tree, and hence an expected
payo for each player in the tree.
For an information set hi; let si=~ s
hi
i denote the strategy that is obtained by replacing
actions prescribed by si at the information set hi and its successors by actions prescribed
by ~ si. The strategy si=~ s
hi
i is called an hi-replacement of si.




To exemplify the above denitions, consider again the game of gure 5. The Expert
(E) has two information sets in T1; two information sets in T2; and one information set
in T3: The following therefore describes a strategy sE of the expert: `0' after 0 in T1; `1'
after 1 in T1; `0' after 0 in T2; `1' after 0
1 in T2; `0' after 0 in T3:
What about the DM? She has no information sets contained in T1 (!), one information
18set in T2 (with two nodes in it) and two singleton information sets in T3: The following
therefore describes a strategy sDM of the DM: play a0 in every information sets.
The prole of strategies (sE;sDM) described above induces the following actual paths
in T1:
1. If nature chooses 0; the path is (0, `0', a0). Notice that after 0, `0' in T1; we
read the choice of the DM by following the arrow that leads to her information set
down in T3; and check her choice with the strategy sE there.
2. If nature chooses 1; the path is (1;`1';a0). After 1;`1' in T1; we read the choice of
the DM by following the arrow that leads to her information set, which this time
is in T2.
Observe that the Expert is never actually (in T1) deluded to think that the strategic
interaction is described by the T2-partial game, nor is he ever actually (in T1) unaware
so as to think that the strategic interaction is described by T3: Thus, the moves of sE in
T2 (in particular after nature chooses 0
1; which can never actually happen in reality, i.e.
in T1) describe the DM's belief about the Expert's choice that led to her information set
if she believes that the Expert is using the strategy s
T2
E { the restriction of the strategy
sE to the T2-partial game. Under any solution concept we would need indeed to analyze
what the DM believes at her information set in T2 about the Expert's past actions that
have led her to that information set, and those past moves are determined by a strategy
of the expert in the T2-partial game. This is the reason that we need to dene a strategy
at all the information sets of each player, including those in which he will never actually
move: the latter parts of the strategy become the object of contemplation and analysis
of the other player (or players) when they are deluded or unaware of parts of the actual
game.
2.5 Unawareness
Generalized games can describe many types of games with subjective reasoning. In a
generalized game, a player cannot imagine that she can take an action which is physically
unavailable to her (property I4), but at a given information set i (n) she can nevertheless
imagine that in a succeeding information set she will have an action which is actually
nowhere available in the tree Tn as in the example of Figure 8. Furthermore, she can
imagine that along the path of play another player will forget the history of play, i.e.
19that at a later information set this other player will imagine he is playing in a game tree
which is completely unrelated to the game tree he imagined at an earlier stage along the
path.
Since our main motivation is to analyze games with unawareness rather than games
with arbitrary kinds of subjective reasoning, it is worthwhile spelling out additional
properties of generalized games in which the only reason for players' misconception of
the game is unawareness (and mutual unawareness) of available actions. In extensive-form
games with unawareness the set of trees T forms a join semi-lattice under the inclusion
partial order relation . The maximal tree in this join semi-lattice is the modeler's
objective description of feasible paths of play.
The following additional properties parallel properties of static unawareness structures
in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006).9
U0 Conned awareness: If n 2 T and i 2 In then i(n)  T 0 with T 0  T.
U1 Generalized reexivity: If T 0  T, n 2 T, i(n)  T 0 and T 0 contains a copy nT0 of
n, then nT0 2 i(n).
U2 Introspection: If n0 2 i(n) then i(n0) = i(n). (I.e. property I2.)
U3 Subtrees preserve awareness: If n 2 T 0, n 2 i(n), T  T 0, and T contains a copy
nT of n, then nT 2 i(nT).
U4 Subtrees preserve ignorance: If T  T 0  T 00; n 2 T 00; i (n)  T and T 0 contains
the copy nT0 of n, then i (nT0) = i (n).
U5 Subtrees preserve knowledge: If T  T 0  T 00, n 2 T 00, i (n)  T 0 and T contains
the copy nT of n, then i (nT) consists of the copies that exist in T of the nodes of
i (n).
The following remark is analogous to Remark 3 in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006).
Remark 3 U5 implies U3.
Proof. If n 2 T 0, n 2 i(n), T  T 0, and T contains a copy nT of n, then by U5 i(nT)
must consist of the copies that exist in T of the nodes of i(n). Since by assumption
n 2 i(n) and the copy nT exists in T, we must have nT 2 i(nT). 
9The number of each property corresponds to the respective property in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper
(2006).
20Remark 4 U0 implies I0. U1 implies I1.
Remark 5 U0 is equivalent to I0 and T  T 0 implies T 0  T.
Proof. I0 and T  T 0 implies T 0  T are equivalent to if there exists n 2 T and i 2 In
such that i(n)  T 0 then T 0  T. 
All these properties are static properties in the sense that they relate nodes on one tree
with copies of those nodes in another tree. One may wonder about dynamic properties
of unawareness. The following property states that a player can not become unaware
during the play.
DA Awareness may only increase along a path: If there is a path n;:::;n0 in some
subtree T such that player i is active in n and n0, and i (n)  T while i (n0)  T 0
then T 0  T.
Recall that I3 is the only completely new property imposed on information sets in
generalized games.
Remark 6 Suppose that U0 to U2 hold. Then DA if and only if I3.
Proof. More precisely, we will show rst that if I1 holds, then I3 implies DA. Second,
if U0 and I2 holds, then DA implies I3. This implies the result by Remark 4.
If n;:::;n0 is path in T such that i 2 In \ In0, i(n)  T while i(n0)  T 0 then by I1
we have n 2 i(n)  T. Then by I3, i(n0)  T, which implies DA.
If n0 2 i(n)  T 0 and n0;:::;n00 is path in T 0 such that i 2 In0 \ In00 then by I2,
i(n0) = i(n) and thus by DA if pii(n00)  T 00 then T 00  T 0. By U0, if n00 2 T 0 then
i(n00)  T 00 with T 00  T 0. Hence T 00 = T 0, which implies I3. 
2.6 Awareness of unawareness
In some strategic situations a player may be aware of her unawareness in the sense
that she is suspicious that something is amiss without being able to conceptualize this
`something'. Such a suspicion may aect her payo evaluations for actions that she knows
are available to her. More importantly, she may take actions to investigate her suspicion
if such actions are physically available.
21To model awareness of unawareness some of the trees may include imaginary actions
as placeholders for actions that a player may be unaware of and terminal nodes/evaluations
of payos that reect her awareness of unawareness. (The approach of modeling aware-
ness of unawareness by \imaginary moves" was proposed by Halpern and R^ ego, 2006.)
Consider the example in Figure 8. In both right and left trees, player 1 can decide
























whether or not to raise the suspicion of player 2. If he does not, then player 2 can decide
between two actions. Since in this case player 2's information set is in the lower tree,
she does not even realize that player 1 could have raised her suspicion. If player 1 raises
player 2's suspicion, then player 2's information set is in the left tree. She must decide
whether to investigate her suspicion or not. If she doesn't, then she can decide between
two actions but this time she realizes that player 1 raised her suspicion (and could have
refrained from doing so); and that she could have chosen to investigate, in which case she
may have had `something' else to do, that she cannot conceptualize in advance. Once she
investigates, she becomes aware of two more actions and her information set is in the right
tree. She also realizes that player 1 initially raised her suspicion without being explicitly
aware of those actions of hers by himself. Note that before she decides whether or not to
investigate, she is not modeled as anticipating to be in the right tree, because she cannot
conceptualize the nature of the actions she reveals if and when she investigates.
222.7 The connection to standard extensive-form games
Harsanyi (1967) showed how to transform games with asymmetric information into games
with imperfect information about a move of nature. Can a similar idea be used to
transform any generalized extensive-form game into a standard extensive-form game?
Given a generalized extensive-form game   with a partially ordered set of trees T, one
could dene the transformation of   to be the extensive-form game with an initial move
of nature, in which nature chooses one of the trees in T.
Notice, however, that the resulting structure would not be a standard extensive-form
game. To see this, notice that every standard extensive-form game has the following
property (E): the equivalence class of nodes in which a player considers as possible a
given possibility set of nodes is identical with that possibility set; this set is called an
information set of the player, and in all of its nodes the player has the same set of
available actions. In contrast, in the transformation considered above for games with
misperceptions, this equivalence class may be a strict super-set of the possibility set. For
example, when the generalized game in Figure 9(a) is transformed so as to have an initial
move of nature, the possibility set for the (unique) player is the right node, while the
equivalence class contains both the right and left node.
Figure 9:
t ab      c nature nature
ab    ab      c ab    ab      c ab   
(a) (b) (c)
Thus, if after adding the initial move of nature the information sets are dened to be
synonymous with the possibility sets, the resulting game would be non-standard, because
for some information set there may be additional nodes outside it in which the player
considers it as possible (as in Figure 9(b), where in the left node the player considers
only the right node as possible). If, in contrast, we choose the alternative denition, by
which an information set is the equivalence class in which a player has a particular set
of nodes that she considers as possible, the resulting game would again be non-standard,
23this time because the actions available to the player in the nodes of a given information
set might not be identical across these nodes (as in Figure 9(c), where in the left node
the player has more available actions than in the right node, even though both are within
the same information set).10
There is also another aspect that prevents the above transformation from yielding
a standard extensive-form game. In a standard extensive-form game each player has
a full-support prior on the moves of nature.11 Using Bayes rule, the player therefore
has a well-dened belief about nature at each stage of the game. In contrast, in the
above transformation each player ascribes probability 1 only to one of the initial moves
of nature; moreover, along the path of play the player may switch completely the move
of nature in which she condes even if nothing in the path of play itself imposed such a
switch. Such a switch corresponds to a node in the generalized game in which the player is
defined as becoming aware of new aspects of the dynamic interaction; such an increase
of awareness may occur even when the physical path of play per se did not imply a
surprise, and may have also been compatible with the player's previous conception of the
game. Thus, if we do add an initial move of nature to connect the trees of the generalized
game, the player's (evolving) belief about nature cannot be encapsulated within an initial
probabilistic belief about nature, and must be represented explicitly by a belief system
as part of the denition of the game.
Adding an initial move of nature has a further conceptual drawback. In classical
extensive-form games the implicit assumption is that the players understand the entire
structure of the dynamic interaction as embodied in the game tree.12 Assigning prob-
ability zero to some move of nature is still compatible with realizing what could have
happened if this zero-probability move were nevertheless to materialize. This is concep-
tually distinct from being completely unaware of a subset of paths in the game, and it is
the latter concept that we want to model here. Moreover, as we have seen in the example
of the introduction (Figures 3 and 4), it may lead to behavioral predictions dierent from
10In this example of a game with a single player who is unaware of her action c, one could obviously
describe the game simply as a single-person decision problem between a and b. This would not be
possible, however, in more complex games like the one in Figure 2. There, one cannot do away with any
of the nodes in the upper tree or in the lower tree; if these two trees are joined by a preceding move
of nature, then when player 1 doesn't tell player 2 about the Mozart concert, player 2's information set
becomes non-standard.
11Moreover, in the classical denition of an extensive-form game the priors of the dierent players
about nature are actually identical, i.e. the players have a common prior about nature.
12For instance, Myerson (1991, p. 4) puts forward explicitly the tenet that game theory deals with
intelligent players, where \a player in the game is intelligent if he knows everything that we know about
the game and he can make any inference about the situation that we can make."
24unawareness.
Thus, standard extensive-form games are neither technically t (without further gen-
eralization) for modeling behavior under dynamic misperceptions and unawareness, nor
do they convey the appropriate conceptual apparatus for modeling such interactions,
hence the need for our denition of generalized games.13
3 Extensive-form rationalizability
Pearce (1984) dened extensive-form (correlated) rationalizable strategies by a procedure
of an iterative elimination of strategies. The idea behind the denition involves a notion
of forward induction. In generic perfect-information games, rationalizable strategy pro-
les yield the backward induction outcome, though they need not be subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategies (Reny 1992, Battigalli 1997).
In what follows we extend this denition to generalized extensive-form games.
A belief system of player i















about the other players' strategies in
the Thi-partial game, for each information set hi 2 Hi; with the following properties
 bi (hi) reaches hi, i.e. bi (hi) assigns probability 1 to the set of strategy proles of
the other players that reach hi.
 If hi precedes h0
i (hi   h0
i) then bi (h0
i) is derived from bi (hi) by Bayes rule whenever
possible.
Denote by Bi the set of player i's belief systems.
13Even if one nevertheless prefers to model such interactions using an initial move of nature and
generalizing accordingly the notions of information sets and beliefs about nature in standard extensive-
form games, the properties (I0)-(I6) of our denition constitute restrictions on the structure of such
\extended" standard games that are needed in order to guarantee e.g. that the expectations of each
player about future paths are dynamically consistent (property I3) and perfect recall is well-dened
(property I6).
25For a belief system bi 2 Bi, a strategy si 2 Si and an information set hi 2 Hi; dene
player i's expected payo at hi to be the expected payo for player i in Thi given bi (hi),
the actions prescribed by si at hi and its successors, assuming that hi has been reached.
We say that with the belief system bi and the strategy si player i is rational at the
information set hi 2 Hi if there exists no action a0
hi 2 Ahi such that only replacing the
action si (hi) by a0
hi results in a new strategy s0
i which yields player i a higher expected
payo at hi given the belief bi (hi) on the other players' strategies S
Thi
 i .
We now turn to dene extensive-form rationalizability in generalized extensive-form
games.14
Denition 1 (Extensive-form Rationalizable strategies) Dene, inductively, the




i = fsi 2 Si: there exists a belief system bi 2 B1
i
with which for every information set hi 2 Hi player i is rational at hi
. . .
Bk
i = fbi 2 B
k 1
i : for every information set hi; if there exists some prole of the other






j such that s i reaches hi, then bi (hi) assigns




i = fsi 2 Si: there exists a belief system bi 2 Bk
i with which for every information set
hi 2 Hi player i is rational at hig
14The following denition generalizes Battigalli's (1997) denition of (correlated) extensive-form
strategies, which he proved to be equivalent to that of Pearce (1984), with the a slight modication: our
denition requires an extensive-form rationalizable strategy si to be optimal w.r.t. some belief also at
information sets which are excluded by the actions of si at some preceding information set.
This means that in standard extensive-form games our denition renes the Pearce-Battigalli denition,
but gives rise to the same plans of action. (A plan of action of a player is an equivalence class of her
strategies which are identical in all the player's information sets that are not excluded by any of these
strategies.)
Another slight dierence between the denition here and that of Battigalli (1997) for standard extensive-
form games is that for a given belief system and a strategy si, at an information set hi not excluded
earlier by si Battigalli compares si to all its hi-replacements, while we restrict attention only to `local' hi-
replacements which alter si solely at hi. By the one-deviation principle (see e.g. Perea, 2002), for a given
belief system bi a strategy si is dominated by no hi-replacement at no information set hi unexcluded by
si if and only if si is dominated by no `local' hi-replacement at no information set hi unexcluded by si:
Hence, in standard extensive-form games, at each iteration of the inductive denition below the plans
of actions of the surviving strategies are identical to those surviving Battigalli's denition.









The denition captures rationality and common strong belief in rationality (Battigalli
and Siniscalchi, 2002): At each information set, a rationalizable strategy should be op-
timal vis-a-vis some belief over the opponents strategy; if the information set is reached
by some tuple of optimal opponents' strategies (vis-a-vis some beliefs of theirs), then the
player's belief is further required to be concentrated on such tuples; if, furthermore, the
information set is reached by some tuple of the opponents' strategies which are optimal
vis-a-vis a belief system of theirs concentrated on optimal strategies of their opponents,
the player's belief should concentrated on those tuples; and so forth.
In other words, along each feasible path of play, in the rst information set an ac-
tive player believes that all her opponents will behave rationally, will believe that their
opponents will behave rationally, etc. If at some information set in the game all the
opponents' strategy proles which could lead to that information set fail this ideal con-
dition, the player seeks a best rationalization (Battigalli, 1996) which could have led to
that information set.
For example, if player i has a unique opponent j, who has only two strategies that
lead to an information set of i{s0
j which is strictly dominated for j, and sj which is
optimal for j but only under a belief of j that i is (or was, or will be) irrational, then
at that information set i is required to believe that in the sequel j will continue to
employ sj (because sj embodies a better rationalization of j's past behavior than does
s0
j). Forward induction reasoning then implies that from that information set onwards, i
's rationalizable strategy should be optimal vis-a-vis sj, unless a further information set
h0
i is reached which is compatible only with s0
j; at h0
i player i has no choice but to revert
to the belief that j is irrational, and react accordingly.
The denition of this solution concept for generalized extensive-form games highlights
the need to dene the notion of a strategy as we did, by the actions taken not only at
the tree T1 which represents the physical paths of the game, but also at all the other
trees T 2 T. True, to track the physical paths compatible with proles of extensive-form
rationalizable strategies it is enough to look at their restrictions to T1. However, at each
given node n 2 T1 in which player i is active, the set of nodes i (n) that she considers as
possible is a subset of her subjective view of the feasible paths Ti(n), and at that point
27she can only contemplate her strategy in terms of the Ti(n)-partial game. Furthermore,
in order to rank the opponents' strategies according to their rationality, player i has to
weigh them in the terms the opponents conceive the game, i.e. in the T-partial games
which represent their subjective view of the strategic interaction within the Ti(n)-partial
game (which may be dierent than the actual subjective views the opponents have on
the game at various nodes of T1); and so forth.
This means that proles of extensive-form rationalizable strategies have a dierent
signicance in their dierent domains. In T1 they dene paths which could actually be
realized; for n 2 T1 for which Ti(n) 6= T1, in Ti(n) these proles dene paths conceived
as feasible by player i when the actual node at T1 is n; for n0 2 Ti(n) for which Tj(n0) 6=
Ti(n); in Tj(n0) these proles dene paths that at node n 2 T1 player i conceives player j





i for every k > 1.
Proof. Consider si 2 Rk
i. By denition, si is rational at each of player i's informa-
tion sets given some belief system bi 2 Bk
i . Since Bk
i  B
k 1
i , si is also be rational at
each of player i's information sets given a belief system in B
k 1




Proposition 1 The set of rationalizable strategies is non-empty.
The proof is in the appendix.
It may be instructive to compare explicitly the extensive-form rationalizablity strate-
gies in our battle-of-the-sexes example from the introduction (Figures 1 and 2).15
Remark 8 In the Bach-Stravinsky-Mozart example with unavailability of actions from
the introduction (Figure 1) both players have a unique rationalizable strategy while in the
Bach-Stravinsky-Mozart example with unawareness (Figure 2), no player has a unique
rationalizable strategy.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
15We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
28When we compare these examples, then the main dierence arises from the the lack
of forward induction of player II under unawareness. In the Bach-Stravinsky-Mozart
example with unawareness (Figure 2), player II can not forward induce anything from
the action \don't tell" taken by player I since former is unaware of this action. Yet,
in the Bach-Stravinsky-Mozart example with the unavailability of an action (Figure 1)
player II can forward induce from the action \don't give the car" player I's intention to
go to the Bach concert. In other words, awareness of an available action (providing the
car for going to the Mozart concert) and certainty that it hasn't been taken has stronger
strategic implications than unawareness of the very same action.
In the Bach-Stravinsky-Mozart example with unawareness (Figure 2), the rational-
izable outcome is not unique. This is in contrast to the example with unavailability of
actions instead, where there is a rationalizable outcome. However, there exist also games
where with unavailability of actions there are more rationalizable outcomes than with
unawareness of the same actions. Such an example is presented in Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper (2011b).
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed by induction.
B1
i is non-empty. Indeed, to construct a belief system bi, for each information set
hi with no predecessors (according to the precedence relation  ) in the arborescence of
information sets Hi; assign to player i a full-support belief bi (hi) on the other players'
strategies S
Thi
 i that reach hi. The full-support guarantees that Bayes rule is applicable
for deriving the beliefs of player i in all her remaining information sets.
Suppose, by induction, we have already shown that Bk
i is non-empty. We have to
show that Rk
i is non-empty. For a typical belief system bi 2 Bk
i we have to construct a
strategy si 2 Rk
i; i.e. a strategy with which player i is rational at each of her information
sets Hi given the belief system bi. Since Hi is an arborescence, it is standard to construct
such a strategy si by backward induction on Hi.
To complete the induction step, observe that B
k+1
i is non-empty, because by denition
it singles out a non-empty subset of Bk
i .




every k  1, for some ` we eventually get R`
i = R
`+1

























A.2 Proof of Remark 8
Note rst that a strategy for player I in the game of Figure 1 is a function that prescribes
an action at the root of the tree and each matrix whereas in the game of Figure 2 it is a
function that prescribes an action at the root of the tree, the left and right matrices in
the upper tree as well as an action in the lower matrix. Consequently, the belief systems
of player II dier accordingly in those examples.
To make the dierences and similarities between the examples more transparent, we
will derive the extensive-form rationalizable strategies for both examples side-by-side.
At the rst level, any strategy is rational for player
I except all strategies that prescribe going to the
Mozart concert after \don't give". For player II,
both the Bach concert and the Stravinsky con-
cert are rational if player I does not give him the
car. If player I does give him the car, then only
the Mozart concert is rational since it is a domi-




where the rst component of a strategy refers to
player II's action in the left matrix and the second
refers to the right matrix.
At the rst level, any strategy is rational for player
I except all strategies that prescribe going to the
Mozart concert after \don't tell". For player II,
both the Bach concert and the Stravinsky concert
are rational if he is unaware of the Mozart concert.
If he is aware of the Mozart concert, then only this
concert is rational since it is a dominant action
conditional of being in the right matrix. Thus,
R1
II = f(M;B);(M;S)g;
where the rst component of a strategy refers to
player II's action in the right matrix and the sec-
ond refers to the lower matrix.
30At the second level, player I is certain that player
II will go to the Mozart concert when given the car.
Thus, any second level rational strategy for player
I must prescribe going to the Mozart concert after
\give the car". Not giving the car to player II and
going to the Stravinsky concert is dominated by
giving the car to player II and going to the Mozart
concert. Not giving player II the car and going to
the Bach concert is rational for player I assuming
that she believes with probability at least 1
4 that
player II will go to the Bach concert. Giving the
car to player II and going to the Mozart concert is
rational for player I if she believes with probability
at least 3
4 that player II would go to the Stravinsky






where the second (resp. third) component of the
strategy vector refers to player I's choice after his-
tory \don't give" (resp. \give"). For player II,
R2
II = R1
II since the deletion of M in the left ma-
trix for player I at the rst level does not inuence
the optimality of any strategy of player II because
when player I takes M any of player II's actions
yields the same payo in the left matrix.
At the second level, player I is certain that player
II will go to the Mozart concert when told about it.
Thus, any second level rational strategy for player
I must prescribe going to the Mozart concert af-
ter \don't tell". Not telling player II about the
Mozart concert and going to the Stravinsky con-
cert is dominated by telling player II about the
Mozart concert and going to the Mozart concert.
Not telling player II about the Mozart concert and
going to the Bach concert is rational for player I as-
suming that she believes with probability at least
1
4 that (the unaware) player II will go to the Bach
concert. Telling player II about the Mozart con-
cert and going to the Mozart concert is rational
for player I if she believes with probability at least
3
4 that player II would go to the Stravinsky con-
cert if not told about the Mozart concert. In the
lower tree, both players are unaware of the Mozart
concert. Going to Bach is rational for player I if
she believes with probability at least 1
4 that player
II goes to Bach as well. Going to the Stravin-
sky convert is rational for player I if she believes
with probability at least 3
4 that player II goes to
Stravinsky. This is just the standard Battle-of-







where the second (resp. third) component of the
strategy vector refers to player I's choice after his-
tory \don't tell" (resp. \tell"), and the last com-
ponent denotes the action in the lower subtree.
For player II, note that his strategy does not pre-
scribe an action in the left matrix. Hence, the
deletion of M in the left matrix for player I at the
rst level has no eect on the optimality of of any
strategy of player II. Thus R2
II = R1
II.
So far, the arguments are analogous in both examples. A dierence arises at the third level for player
II. For player I, any second level strategy is also third level rational for player I since in both examples
no strategies of player II have been eliminated at the second level.
31At the third level, when player II is not given the
car, he can \forward induce" that player I will
go to the Bach concert. This is because any sec-
ond level rational strategy of player I prescribes
the Bach concert after the history \don't give the
car". Consequently, a third level rational strat-
egy of player II must prescribe going to the Bach
concert as well when not given the car. Thus,
R3
II = f(B;M)g:
At the third level, when player II is not told about
the Mozart concert, he can not \forward induce"
that player I will go to the Bach concert. This
is because he is unaware of the Mozart concert
and his information set is located in the lower
subtree of Figure 2. At this matrix, both Bach
and Stravinsky are second level rational actions




At the fourth level, if player I gives the car to
player II, then latter will go to the Bach concert.
Otherwise, if player I does not give the car to
player II, then latter will go to the Mozart con-
cert. Since player I strictly prefers to the Mozart
concert together with player II, any fourth level
rational strategy of player I must involve her not
giving the car to player II. Thus,
R4
I = f(\don't give";B;M)g = Rk
I; for all k  4:
For both players, no strategies were eliminated at
the third level. Thus, no further strategies can be
eliminated at any level k  3.
Hence, the extensive-form rationalizable strategies
are
R1
I = f(\don't give";B;M)g;
R1
II = f(B;M)g:
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